Review of “Heidegger and the Ideology of War: Community, Death and the West” by Manoussakis, John P.
Essays in Philosophy
Volume 5
Issue 1 The Philosophy of Perception Article 27
1-2004
Review of “Heidegger and the Ideology of War:
Community, Death and the West”
John P. Manoussakis
Boston College
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip
Part of the Philosophy Commons
Essays in Philosophy is a biannual journal published by Pacific University Library | ISSN 1526-0569 | http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/
Recommended Citation
Manoussakis, John P. (2004) "Review of “Heidegger and the Ideology of War: Community, Death and the West”," Essays in Philosophy:





Vol. 5 No. 1, January 2004
Book Review
Heidegger and the Ideology of War: Community, Death and the West, by Domenico Losurdo. Translated
by Marella and Jon Morris. New York: Humanity Books, 2001, pp. 256 (ISBN: 1-57392-910-7)
Domenico Losurdo purports to deal here with what has come to be known since 1987 as “l’ affaire
Heidegger,” that is, the alleged involvement of Heidegger in Germany’s National-Socialist Party.
However, and in spite of its title and Heidegger’s photograph in the cover, this book has little to do with
the Master from Freiburg. Heidegger’s philosophy is a passing leitmotiv in Losurdo’s book; one that
occurs again and again perhaps, but also one that never receives the serious treatment that it surely
deserves.
Just a glance in Losurdo’s bibliography is enough to confirm that this is a book with an interest in
history and cultural studies, but not, alas, in philosophy. Disappointingly few works by Heidegger
are cited (and only those, in any case, that are thought to have had some historical or political
impact); and most serious secondary literature on Heidegger’s thought is simply lacking.
There is, on the other hand, a plethora of historical sources that succeeds in painting Germany’s war
years in the most vivid colors. Losurdo examines a diverse group of thinkers that figured pre-
eminently in the first half of the century and played a catalytic role in shaping Germany’s
intellectual milieu. Max and Marianne Weber, Thomas Mann, Edmund Husserl, Sigmund Freud,
Karl Jaspers, Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Ernst Jünger, Carl Schmitt, and Oswald Spengler
are a few of the figures that parade throughout Losurdo’s pages (again, Heidegger, as the reader will
come to realize, is just one among them and not necessarily the central one). But here perhaps lies
another weakness of this work: the vastness of the material presented badly needs some sort of
structure. It is not clear whether the seven chapters of this book were originally conceived as parts
of a whole, since much of the material is not thematically discussed under a single chapter but
rather scattered in bits and pieces throughout the book.
Losurdo takes the year 1914 as the turning point in last century’s European history. That year, he
argues, marked the rise of Kriegsideologie. He pinpoints the development of the ideology of war
into a series of terms paired antithetically. He juxtaposes, for example, the concept of Gemeinschaft
(community) to that of Gesellschaft (society): the former was invented as a term that would
distinguish the essential bond among the people (Volk) over against the bourgeois formation of
relationships expressed by society. Since the former is clearly a term that comes out of the
ideological arsenal of nationalism, Losurdo has only to show that Heidegger used this (or similar)
terminology in order to brand him as such. Another opposition employed by Losurdo is the one
between Kultur and Zivilisation, the first stands for the cultural achievements of a romanticized
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Athens, the second for the brutality of military force represented by the Imperium Romanum.
Finally, the author singles out a series of themes that, according to him, can help us define the rise
of Kriegsideologie. Among them, one can mention the fascination with death and the exaltation of
sacrifice (chapter one), the preoccupation with one’s own destiny or the destiny of one’s nation
(chapters two and three), the nostalgia for a heroic past, usually exemplified in the history of Greece
(chapter six), the idealization of the land, and the decline of the West (chapter five).
From the historian’s perspective, Losurdo succeeds in localizing these themes and motifs in a
variety of sources and in bringing them together in order to paint the panorama of a Continent that
sinks into ideological, political and military conflict. The author, however, fails to show how we
are to read all these themes back into Heidegger’s work. (For a coincidental similarity in
terminology does not prove much.) He also fails to establish a clear connection (although implied in
many instances) between Heidegger’s thinking and the political agenda of Nazi Germany. For
instance, one remains baffled in reading Losurdo’s conclusion that “[Heidegger] continues to
remain, to the very end, bound to Nazi Germany, despite his contradictory relationship with it, and
despite his unceasing and tormented reinterpretation of that relationship.” (234)
In the end, is Heidegger’s thought ideological? Even if we take, by means of an example, the most
notorious text in Heidegger’s corpus, namely the Rektoratrede (“The Self-Assertion of the German
University”) of 1933—a text often cited by Losurdo himself—we realize that the issue at hand is
not easy to decide, and definitely not by a journalist’s look at the facts surrounding it. At the outset,
one finds there almost all the symptoms of an ideological discourse: the exaltation of the will and
the obedience to the national destiny, the allusions to the Greek beginning, against which present
day Germans are to measure themselves, and finally, the connection between the Germanic Volk
and, as Heidegger puts it, its “erd- und bluthaften Kräfte” (a phrase that sounds disturbingly akin
to the Nazi Blut und Boden). But what amounts to an acute ideological blunder—and this is a point
that escapes Losurdo’s analysis—is Heidegger’s willingness to degenerate the pursuit of knowledge
into a form of service. The “Knowledge service” is, as he writes, “of equal rank” with Labor and
Armed service—and when and only when these three services “coalesce and become one formative
force” then one can say that the destiny of the German University has been fulfilled. Hannah
Arendt, in her Origins of Totalitarianism, had aptly observed that it is a characteristic of ideology
to suspend any activity but one: labor. Heidegger seems here to commit the same ideological
maneuver when he demands the transformation of education into a sort of compulsory Arbeitsdienst.
His Rectorial Address had begun with a hermeneutical coup d’état, namely, with the subordination
of contemplative life (theoria) to action (energeia, a term that he translates as being-at-work). Since
this vocabulary alludes to Aristotle, one could argue against such a formulation by borrowing from
the insights of the same thinker with regards to the birth of philosophy in leisure (schole, the very
word that gives us the English “school”), and the fact that philosophical discourse is liberal, that is
to say, resistant to servile and militant usage toward any kind of “aims” (Meta. I, 981b).
Yet one could not decide the matter at issue (i.e., the ideological implications, if any, of
Heidegger’s thought) without first undertaking a systematic examination of Heidegger’s philosophy
on its own merit. In other words, before passing judgment on the thinker we have first to address
his thought. And this is something that the reader will not find in Lorurdo’s book. For example, it
is easy for us to misread a passage from the same Rectorial Address as constituting an exemplary
case of the ideology of war, especially when Heidegger insists that “all faculties of will and
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thought, all strengths of the heart and all skills of the body, must unfold through battle, heightened
in battle, and preserve as battle.” (Heidegger’s emphasis, Review of Metaphysics, 38, no 3: 479)
What such a misreading would overlook is the fact that “battle” here stands for a key philosophical
term in Heidegger’s thought, and in philosophy in general for that matter, since he traces it back to
the polemos of Heraclitus’ fragment 53 and he renders it in his own language as Aus-einander-
setzung. (On this and similar matters, I refer the reader to Gregory Fried’s excellent monograph
Heidegger’s Polemos: From Being to Politics (Yale University Press, 2000) and the recently
published Heidegger’s Roots: Nietzsche, National Socialism and the Greeks by Charles Bambach
(Cornell University Press, 2003). Readers of Losurdo’s work would do well to fill in the many gaps
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